Two principles
In most parts of the world, the vast majority of doctors have yet to treat large numbers of patients suffering from AIDS. Unfortunately, this situation is unlikely to continue. Many people are already infected with the HIV virus, and it is spreading at an alarming rate (1) . It will be of small consolation to these doctors that AIDS does not raise any fundamentally novel ethical issues. For the old dilemmas will seem quite as intractable in their new context. Indeed, some of the characteristics of AIDS -its prognosis and transmission, for example -seem to emphasise the starkness of the moral options open to those called upon to treat its sufferers.
In this paper, I shall examine six important areas in which HIV and AIDS infection raise problems for the individual doctor. There are, of course, others. And AIDS gives rise also to questions in the spheres of law and social morality (2) . I hope that what I say may be relevant to these other issues, but it is not my intention to address them directly.
Ethical views are usually expressed from some perspective, be it Christian, Marxist, feminist, or whatever. Two perspectives which Principle. The principles may be stated loosely as follows:
The Autonomy Principle. One ought to respect the rights of autonomy and liberty. The Welfare Principle. One ought to maximise welfare.
I shall call a person who advocates the former principle a liberal, and the latter a utilitarian. One of the striking things about these principles is that many of us, including many doctors, feel attracted by both. On the one hand, we want to respect the rights of individuals to determine their own lives, and, on the other, to fulful our duties of benevolence towards either the individual herself, or other individuals (3) . Often it is this that gives rise to moral dilemmas in particular cases. For the two principles appear on occasion to counsel inconsistent courses of action.
In the cases I am about to discuss, I shall illustrate the position on each of a liberal and a utilitarian, as I have described them (4) . What is remarkable is that their practical conclusions are quite opposite in every case. I shall deal with each area in the form of a casestudy. This is not only for the sake of clarity, but for a further reason which I shall later make clear. The cases, and indeed the positions taken on them, are over-simplified -and to that extent artificial -in order to emphasise their salient features.
2. Some problems (i) Paternalism. Alan is told by his doctor that the results of the tests he consented to have been returned, and that he is not, as far as she knows, HIV-positive (5) . Alan is known by the doctor to be at risk. He is an intravenous drug-user and engages in a great deal of casual gay sex. The doctor informs him of the dangers and how to avoid them, but Alan refuses to change his lifestyle. He tells the doctor that he intends to continue both to practise unsafe sex and to share needles.
The liberal position. Alan has a right to determine how his own life should go. Once he has been informed, he should not be prevented in any way from continuing as before.
The utilitarian position. The doctor is required, in Alan's own interests, to try to prevent him from engaging in these life-threatening activities. She could, for example, approach those close to Alan and ask them to dissuade Alan from continuing.
(ii) The right to ignorance. Betty has been ill, and asks her doctor to carry out some blood-tests to ascertain the nature of her illness. She expressly requests that, should the tests show that she has AIDS, the doctor not tell her. The tests indicate that she has AIDS.
The liberal position. Betty has a right not to be informed of things which she does not wish to know. The doctor should not violate this right. The utilitarian position. Betty cannot be cured of the disease, but there is treatment available which can alleviate its symptoms. For her to receive that treatment, it is necessary that she be told. If she is not treated, her own welfare and that of her friends and relations will be damaged for no good reason. There is also the possibility of risk to third parties.
(iii) Conftdentiality. Colin, a bisexual married man, is advised by his doctor that he is HIV-positive. The doctor asks him whether he intends to inform his wife, or to practise only safe sex with her. Colin tells the doctor that he intends to do neither, and that he will continue to engage in unprotected sex with his wife. (v) Consent. Eric's doctor suspects that Eric may have anaemia, and Eric therefore agrees to a blood-sample being taken. After Eric has left the surgery, the local health authority contact the doctor to ask whether they may use the blood-samples taken at the surgery that day in random and anonymous blood-testing for HIV.
The tests are aimed solely at obtaining statistics concerning the spread of the virus in the area.
The liberal position. Eric has a right over his body, and its parts. If the doctor believes that the blood should be released to the authority for testing, Eric must be informed and his consent obtained.
The utilitarian position. Eric will not know that his blood has been tested, and because the tests are randomised and anonymous, no harm can come to him even if he is HIV-positive. Therefore, the doctor can agree immediately to the health authority's request.
(vi) The rights of patients. Fiona is a general practitioner, who has become HIV-positive through sexual contact with a bisexual man. Although she is aware that if they knew of this many of her patients would prefer to register with another doctor than be treated by her, she intends to continue to practise without informing her patients of her condition.
The liberalposition. Patients have a right to be informed of any condition of their doctors which may threaten their lives. Fiona should either cease to practise, or inform her patients so that they can make an informed choice.
The utilitarian position. The patients are very unlikely to be harmed if treated by Fiona. She will certainly suffer greatly should she have to cease practising, or see the number of her patients fall drastically. Therefore, she should continue to practise, and keep her condition hidden for as long as possible.
These, then, are the areas on which I want to focus. Clearly, some moral issues arise in more than one area. Consent, for example, is relevant not only in the case of Eric, but in every other case besides that of Doreen. But in general the various problems in each area are sufficiently distinct to justify my differentiating them as I have.
Possible solutions
The cases I have discussed will present themselves to most people as moral dilemmas. This is because, as I noted, most of us are neither pure liberals nor pure utilitarians. But this puts us in a quandary whenever the two principles -the Autonomy and Welfare Principles -conflict. Sometimes, of course, they will not. Often welfare can be maximised most efficiently by respecting a person's autonomy ('only she knows what she really wants'). But If the latter is the case, then I believe that Alan's autonomy should be respected. Even in the former case, the doctor should take steps to interfere warily and only after much reflection.
(ii) The right to ignorance: should Betty be told that she is suffering from AIDS?
In certain cases of cancer, doctors argue that the patient should not be told of her illness on the ground that it lessens the chance of recovery. In the case of AIDS, however, there is no chance of recovery. But patients can be kept well to some degree in cases of both terminal cancer and AIDS. Effective treatment requires some understanding by the patient of the nature of the disease, in order that she may participate in active interventions. For example, treatment using the drug Zidovudine (AZT) would prolong Betty's life and improve its quality. Also relevant is that with appropriate support and counselling patients usually adapt well to their illness, even when they have previously taken a very negative attitude towards it. Given all this, and taking into account also the facts that Betty's accelerated deterioration is likely to cause great upset to her family and friends, that she may put others at risk, and that she will find out anyway that she has the disease, I am inclined to say that she should be informed -tactfully and gently -of the result of the tests (8).
(iii) Confidentiality: should Colin's wife be informed?
When we contemplate the position of this couple in isolation from the rest of society, it is quite clear that the wife should be told. Colin's autonomy is important, but not to the extent that he should be enabled to put the life of another person at serious risk. But there is a further (utilitarian) argument in favour of confidentiality, based on a broader view ofthe case (9) . If it becomes known that doctors breach confidentiality, it is said, other people with AIDS will be more reluctant to come forward, and this will cause more harm overall. This argument, of course, rests on certain empirical assumptions. And these assumptions are almost certainly false. First, doctors will be called upon to breach their obligations only in a very few cases, where they have been unable to persuade the patient to do her duty. (Doctors are already permitted or required to do this in certain cases.). Second, there is still a strong self-interested reason to motivate people with AIDS to visit doctors, even if they are worried about breaches of confidentiality. Dying from AIDS is extremely unpleasant, and dying without professional medical care even more so. (Of course, this latter reason will not apply to those who are merely HIVpositive.) (iv) The rights of practitioners: should the doctor treat Doreen?
It might be said that Doreen will suffer no harm by being transferred to another doctor, whereas if the doctor is required to treat her, his autonomy will be violated. Both of these claims are incorrect. The role of doctors as pillars of the community should not be ignored. Doreen may well hold her doctor in high regard, as a respected and sympathetic figure. To be rejected by him when she is in dire need ofcomfort and support could be very damaging. But what of the doctor's autonomy? Medicine is a profession, and becoming a professional requires one to surrender one's moral autonomy in the sphere ofthe profession in order to place oneself under the special obligations of the profession. It is unlikely to be morally appropriate for a doctor to act in a way inconsistent with his professional duty. He exercised his autonomy in entering that profession, and it is partly doctors' readiness to abide by the requirements of their profession that makes them so valuable to the community. Now it may be said that even a doctor is not required to give up his life for his patients. There is much in this. But the doctor here is not being asked to give up his life. He is being asked to place his life at some risk. But his professional obligations of course require him to put his life at some risk. Here the risk of infection is so small, especially if the doctor takes precautions, that it is clear that he is obliged to treat Doreen.
(v) Consent: can Eric's blood be tested?
Autonomy does involve certain rights of selfownership. A doctor cannot remove important organs from Eric's body against his will in order to benefit a number of others. But do these rights extend to small amounts of blood which have anyway been transferred to others? I think not. If I find that my hairdresser has been sweeping up hair-clippings at the end of the day, washing them, and using them as stuffing for cushions for his dog, it would be absurd for me to insist that he seek my permission first. Whatever happens to the hair-clippings, my autonomy remains unviolated. The same applies with the blood-sample, as long as (a) the tests are randomised and anonymous (to protect Eric's rights to confidentiality and ignorance); and (b) Eric has not specifically requested that such tests not be carried out. It is worth pointing out that it is already common practice for blood to be tested in this way for various other infections. It might be argued that Eric's consent should anyway be sought (10) . But if his autonomy will not be violated by the tests, this will be merely a waste of time and resources which could be put to better use elsewhere. There are also the social benefits accruing from greater knowledge of the epidemiology of the disease to be considered.
(vi) The rights ofpatients: should Fiona tell her patients that she is HIV-positive?
It will help to clarify the issues in this case if we imagine another, similar in all relevant respects except that the patient is objecting to the doctor because she is black. We should not be any more Using the richer conception of welfare, then, I have been able to approach in a more balanced way the problems raised. I do not expect the reader to agree with the substance of all the proposed solutions above. What I am attempting primarily is to suggest a methodology which will not ignore the importance of either autonomy or welfare.
I want to conclude with a general point about our approach to practical moral questions. This point is especially relevant to those called upon to treat people with AIDS. For they will, as I have said, meet old problems in new guises.
My aim in this paper has been the modest one of removing an obstacle to moral thinking. I do not expect that a doctor will be able to take the notion of welfare I have advanced and use it as just another tool of the trade, like a stethoscope. Moral decisions are of such complexity that they are not made, and cannot be made, solely on the basis of a number of explicit, stateable principles. Doctors should well be able to appreciate this, for it seems that there is a strong analogy between their methods of diagnosis and moral decision-making (11) . Doctors take the symptoms of the patient as considerations, and judge in the light of them. This capacity to judge in such spheres is found in what Aristotle calls aisthesis -'perception', or 'sensitivity' (12) . Medical sensitivity comes with medical experience. We are likely to find less practised doctors consulting more experienced colleagues on unusual cases. Likewise, the capacity to make moral decisions is partly a matter of sensitivity to relevant considerations. And moral aisthesis also comes through experience (13) . This was my second reason for employing case studies above. By contemplating hypothetical cases, elaborating upon them, and discussing them with others, doctors will sharpen their sensitivity to the actual moral considerations in the dilemmas which are bound to occur in their everyday practice (14) . AIDS, being so new and so terrible, poses a great challenge to not only the medical but the ethical capacities of doctors. Serious moral thinking about the disease can serve only to prepare them for the deluge of suffering they are about to face.
